Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory:
Article I, Section 7
George R. Nock*
I.

INTRODUCTION

No provision of the Washington Constitution has received a
more vigorous workout than article I, section 7, which ostensibly
relates to searches and seizures. The qualification of ostensibility
arises because the section, unlike its federal constitutional counterpart, makes no explicit reference to either searches or
seizures. Rather, it reads as follows: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." 1
By contrast, the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, thought by some a model of terseness, seems as
windy as an Independence Day oration:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
2
things to be seized.
These two passages have exactly five words in common: no,
be, in, or, of. Yet, wondrously, courts have interpreted the provisions as identical in nearly all important respects, and the areas
of divergence have had little to do with textual differences.
Washington case law dealing with searches and seizures has
now reached a developmental stage from which it can proceed
either haphazardly or along any of several well-defined lines.
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a compendium of
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A., San Jose State
University, 1961; J.D., Hastings College of Law, University of California, 1966.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Nicholas R. Franz, member of the
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1. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Washington search-and-seizure cases. 3 Rather, the Article analyzes the more recent (and some of the earlier) cases in which
the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section
7, and suggests several alternative theoretical bases for the further development of Washington constitutional search-andseizure jurisprudence.

II.

HISTORY

The adoption, or what is known of it, and the history of the
interpretation of article I, section 7,4 have been detailed elsewhere.' In brief, the provision was adopted by the Washington
State Constitutional Convention in 1889, after the convention
had rejected a proposal to adopt language identical to the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' "Unfortunately,
history provides little guidance to the intention of the framers
when they chose the specific language of Const. art. I, § 7."17 The
Washington Supreme Court cited section 7 extensively in the
years following the federal Supreme Court's enunciation of the
exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.8 The provision
eventually lost significance, however, because it was interpreted
so broadly as to allow most police searches on the theory that
they were incident to lawful arrests. 9 Following Mapp v. Ohio,"0
section 7 fell into desuetude as federal court decisions interpreting the fourth amendment rapidly took center stage. The federal
courts developed search-and-seizure doctrine so quickly and
interpreted citizens' rights so expansively that Washington's
fourth amendment counterpart was generally forgotten." Only
3. Such a compendium has been prepared and presented in mimeographed form to
the Washington judiciary by Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington Supreme Court.
This 132-page untitled work, containing all cases through July 1982, deserves general
publication. It has been an invaluable research tool in the preparation of this Article,
and the author is deeply indebted to Justice Utter for his willingness to permit its use
for this purpose.
4. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
5. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690-99, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243-47 (1983).
6. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at
497 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
7. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983).
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule generally excludes evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment.
9. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 693-97, 674 P.2d 1240, 1244-47 (1983).
10. 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (exclusionary rule held to be an essential part of the
fourth amendment).
11. See State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983).
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after the United States Supreme Court's expansion of these
rights stopped, and its contraction of the same rights began, 2
did Washington resurrect its own constitutional provisions.1 3
Since rediscovering section 7, the Washington Supreme
Court has worked a rather massive change in search-and-seizure
law through only seven decisions,14 each of which expressly
rejects one or more United States Supreme Court cases. These
seven opinions are worth considering in some detail, as they present the entire corpus of Washington decisions explicitly resting
on section 7 and rejecting fourth amendment constructs.
The case that marks the Washington Supreme Court's first
gingerly post-Mapp step in the direction of its own search-andseizure jurisprudence is State v. Hehman,15 a reaction to the
United States Supreme Court decisions in United States v.
6 and Gustafson v.
Robinson"
Florida. 7 All three decisions
8
involved traffic arrests' followed by full searches of the persons
of the arrestees. The United States Supreme Court upheld both
of the searches that it considered, taking the view that a fullscale body search is an inherently reasonable incident of a fullcustody arrest. 9 Because the issue was not raised, the Court
assumed the validity of a full-custody arrest for a minor traffic
offense.2"
In Hehman, the Washington court did not dispute the
United States Supreme Court's conclusions concerning the reasonableness of searches incident to arrests, but held that a fullcustody arrest for a minor traffic offense, when the offender is
12. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
13. See cases cited infra note 14.
14. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419
(1984); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983); State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199
(1980); State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
15. 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
16. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
17. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
18. In Hehman, the defendant was stopped for a defective taillight and arrested
when found to have an expired driver's license. 90 Wash. 2d at 46, 578 P.2d at 527. In
Robinson, the defendant was arrested on probable cause that he was operating a vehicle
after revocation of his license and with a permit obtained by misrepresentation. 414 U.S.
at 220. In Gustafson, the defendant was arrested for driving without having his vehicle
operator's license in his possession. 414 U.S. at 262.
19. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 264-65; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
20. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 262; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220-21.
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willing to sign a promise to appear, is unreasonable under the
Washington Constitution.' The court determined that it did not
need to discuss the validity of the search because the underlying
22
arrest was invalid.
The Washington court became noticeably bolder in State v.
Simpson,23 rejecting flatly and firmly, but not with great persuasive force, United States v. Salvucci,24 which had overruled the
"automatic-standing" rule for federal courts.2 5 The rejection,
which restored automatic standing in Washington, was accompanied by the court's ringing declaration of the right of Washington courts to interpret the state constitution as more protective
of individual rights than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal charter. 2 Although the liberty of so interpreting the Washington Constitution was clearly established,27 the
reasons for the general interpretation were left for another day,
and the reasons for the interpretation in the particular case were
28
tenuous at best.
Simpson was followed by State v. White,29 in which the
30
Washington Supreme Court rejected Michigan v. DeFillippo.
Both White and DeFillippo dealt with the admissibility of the
fruits of otherwise lawful searches made incident to arrests for
21. 90 Wash. 2d at 47, 578 P.2d at 528.
22. The discussion of Hehman, Robinson, and Gustafson in State v. Chrisman, 100
Wash. 2d 814, 819, 676 P.2d 419, 422-23 (1984), implies that the thrust of the rejected
federal decisions was the approval of the underlying traffic arrests. This, as already indicated, is not entirely accurate.
23. 95 Wash. 2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980).
24. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
25. These two cases are treated in great detail in Adams & Nock, Search, Seizure,
and Washington's Section Seven: Standing from Salvucci to Simpson, 6 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 1 (1982).
Under the "automatic standing" rule, a defendant is given standing to object to
admission of the fruits of a search or seizure if he is charged with a crime having as an
essential element the possession of the thing seized at the time of the seizure. See Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227 (1973).
26. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 177, 622 P.2d at 1204.
27. Id. at 177, 622 P.2d at 1204 and authorities cited therein.
28. The court relied on two cases, State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216
(1978), and State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), which interpreted state privacy
provisions that were similar to the Washington State privacy provisions. The state
supreme courts stated that the presence of express guarantees of privacy in the state
constitutions, when compared with the absence of such a guarantee in the federal Constitution, provides clear authority for finding greater protection in search-and-seizure cases
under state law than under the fourth amendment. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 178, 622
P.2d at 1205.
29. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
30. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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violating vagrancy statutes that were unconstitutionally vague.
In each case, the statute was presumptively valid at the time of
the arrest. The United States Supreme Court thought exclusion
of the evidence pointless because police should not be
encouraged to make their own assessments of the validity of
statutes." In addition, the Court reasoned that the police would
hardly be deterred from making arrests by the remote possibility
that a court would hold the statutes invalid.32 The Washington
court, however, excluded the evidence, in part in the interest of
deterring the legislature from enacting similar statutes, 3 and in
part by questioning the propriety of deterrence considerations
34
generally as a basis for application of the exclusionary rule.
By far the most important of the first five cases is State v.
Ringer.36 Ringer involved two prosecutions consolidated on
appeal: Ringer's and Corcoran's. Both prosecutions involved
lawful arrests of drivers who were arrested after leaving their
vehicles.3 In each case, the vehicle was searched and seizable
matter was discovered. In Ringer's case, but not in Corcoran's,
probable cause to search the vehicle presumably existed (in the
form of a strong odor of marijuana emanating therefrom). 7 The
Washington Supreme Court disapproved both searches. 8
Both searches involved in Ringer were constitutional under
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The Court had
held in New York v. Belton"9 that police may search the entire
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest of
the driver. Moreover, the Court had held in United States v.
Ross 40 that probable cause to believe a properly stopped vehicle
contained seizable matter justified a warrantless search of the
vehicle and all containers within the vehicle.
The federal decisions in Belton and Ross are manifestly
31. Id. at 38.
32. Id. at 37-38.
33. 97 Wash. 2d at 103-04, 107-08, 640 P.2d at 1067, 1069-70.
34. See Adams & Nock, supra note 25, at 27-29.
35. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
36. Id. at 688-89, 674 P.2d at 1241-42.
37. Id. at 688-89, 703, 674 P.2d at 1242, 1249.
38. Id. at 700-03, 674 P.2d at 1248-50. The court found that no exigent circumstances existed for searching defendants' vehicles, especially in light of the fact that the
defendants were out of their vehicles and handcuffed at the time the searches took place.
The court also found that it was not impracticable for the officers to obtain warrants
prior to searching the vehicles.
39. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
40. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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unsound. Belton represented an unjustifiable departure from
4 1 which had limited the scope of searches
Chimel v. California,
incident to arrest to the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. The Court's rationale in Chimel was that police need to
search incident to arrest only to discover weapons or concealable
evidence, the latter capable of destruction, the former capable of
threatening the arresting officer or others.4 2 Nevertheless, the
Belton Court allowed a search of the entire passenger compartment because the area of the arrestee's immediate control is difficult to determine when the arrest takes place in an automobile
and because a "bright line" test was necessary so that police
would know the precise limits upon the areas that they might
properly search. 43 It is plain, however, that an arrestee who has
been removed from the car and who typically is handcuffed and
placed in a patrol car4 4 cannot reach any part of the interior of
the vehicle in which he was arrested.
Similarly, the Court's decision in Ross was the ultimate perversion of the "automobile exception" doctrine.4 5 In Carroll v.
United States, 6 probable cause alone justified a search of a
motor vehicle because the vehicle's mobility enabled it to be
moved out of the jurisdiction before a warrant could be
obtained. 7 Ross was merely the latest in a series of cases that
had ignored this justification by applying the automobile exception when the automobile was under police control and thus
clearly not capable of being moved out of the jurisdiction. 48
Faced in Ringer with two decisions of neither binding force
nor persuasive value, the Washington Supreme Court unsurprisingly rejected them. Moreover, it did so gracefully, without
exposition of their deficiencies. The court focused instead, and
for the first time, on the development of a theoretical basis for
interpretation of article I, section 7. The Ringer court discussed
at length the meager history of section 7 and the many early
Washington cases interpreting it, concluding that the section
41. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
42. Id. at 763.
43. 453 U.S. at 459-60.
44. In Ringer, both Corcoran and Ringer had been handcuffed and placed in the
patrol cars prior to the unauthorized searches of their vehicles. 100 Wash. 2d at 688-89,
674 P.2d at 1242.
45. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925).
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
47. Id. at 153.
48. 456 U.S. at 825.
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"poses an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches,
and seizures, with only limited exceptions."4
This dictum, overstated and unsupported, could prove
troublesome. The court discussed numerous common-law decisions governing the right of search incident to arrest and the
early Washington cases unjustifiably expanding that right, overruling the earlier decisions. 50 The court concluded that section 7
sets up a warrant preference rule." It then recognized two (and,
by inference, only two) exceptions to the rule: (1) police may
search the arrestee and, apparently, the area within the arrestee's actual control incident to a lawful arrest, but may search
objects only for weapons and evidence of the crime for which the
arrest was made; and (2) police may make warrantless searches
on probable cause under exigent circumstances. 2
Applying its new rules to the cases at hand, the Washington
court found that the automobile searches could not be justified
as incident to the arrests, since both arrestees were outside the
cars (and, in fact, handcuffed in police patrol cars) when the
arrests occurred.5 3 The court further refused to recognize a right
to search Ringer's vehicle, despite clear probable cause for so
doing. According to the court, such a search required a demonstration of the existence of exigent circumstances justifying failure to seek a search warrant.5 4 Furthermore, the availability of
telephonic warrants must be considered in determining the existence of "exigent circumstances." 5 Since no showing of exigency
was made, and no explanation for failure to seek a telephonic
warrant was advanced by the prosecution (upon which the court
placed the burden of proof), no exigency could be found. With
respect to the search of Corcoran's vehicle, no probable cause
discuss the matter furexisted, 57 and the court had no need 5 to
8
invalidated.
were
ther. Both searches
49. 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 674 P.2d at 1243.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 700, 674 P.2d at 1248. A warrant preference rule provides that searches,
seizures, or other privacy invasions require warrants unless a good reason exists for not
obtaining them.
52. Id. at 699-701, 674 P.2d at 1248-49.
53. Id. at 700, 674 P.2d at 1248.
54. Id. at 701, 674 P.2d at 1249.
55. Id. at 702, 674 P.2d at 1249.
56. Id. at 703, 674 P.2d at 1249.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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There are two practical effects of the Ringer decision. The
first is that it makes searches of vehicles on probable cause more
inconvenient for the police, by requiring warrants or the demonstration of unspecified exigencies justifying their absence.5 9 The
second is that it precludes altogether vehicle searches without
probable cause, many of which would be permissible under federal constitutional interpretations."0
Barely a month after Ringer, the Washington court decided
0 1 In Chrisman, the court rejected an earlier
State v. Chrisman.
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the very same
case.62 The case involved a campus police officer's arrest of a
minor student for possession of alcohol. The officer accompanied
the student to the student's dormitory room so that the student
could retrieve his identification. While standing at the open door
to the room, the officer saw a pipe and seeds on a desk, entered,
found them to be of the type used for smoking marijuana, and
conducted a further search. 3 The Washington Supreme Court
invalidated the search;"' the United States Supreme Court
reversed,"5 and the Washington Supreme Court then invalidated
it again, this time solely on the basis of section 7.66
The United States Supreme Court held that the officer was
entitled to enter the room in order to keep an eye on the arrestee, a natural corollary of the right of an arresting officer to
search the area within the arrestee's immediate control.6 7 The
Washington court, however, concluded that there was no general
rule or "bright line" test to determine the permissible limits of
an officer's conduct in such a situation; these limits were to be
determined by the exigencies arising from the facts of the particular case. 8 The court approved the officer's decision to accompany the student to his dormitory room since there was no other
reasonable way to make sure he would not simply disappear. 9 It
59. Id. at 701, 674 P.2d at 1248 (citing State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559
P.2d 970, 974 (1977)).
60. Id. at 689, 674 P.2d at 1242.
61. 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
62. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
63. 100 Wash. 2d at 816, 676 P.2d at 421.
64. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 714, 619 P.2d 971, 974 (1980).
65. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
66. 100 Wash. 2d at 818, 822, 676 P.2d at 422, 424.
67. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6 (1982).
68. 100 Wash. 2d at 820, 676 P.2d at 423.
69. Id. at 821, 676 P.2d at 424.

19851

Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory

held, however, that the officer had neither subjective belief nor
reasonable ground to fear that the student, once inside his room,
would escape, destroy evidence, or use a weapon.7 0 There was
entry of the room,
thus no actual necessity for the warrantless
71
and the court invalidated the search.
These five cases fall far short of establishing a comprehensive body of law. Hehman did little more than balance a need
for police intrusion against the effect of such an intrusion. Simpson and White dealt not primarily with substantive search-andseizure law, but with the question of when to apply the exclusionary rule to the fruits of certain police conduct. Ringer and
Chrisman, however, established some broad and important
rules.
The Ringer-Chrisman doctrine, in brief, seems to be that
warrantless searches or seizures must be justified, not according
to general rules, but by a clear demonstration of their necessity
under the facts of each case.7 2 Such a doctrine is at once clear,
logical, disquieting, and a little frightening. The doctrine is clear
and logical in its simplicity, which gives maximum effect to the
preference for official intrusion by judicial warrant. It is disquieting because, by apparently repealing the set of rules that
guides and therefore controls police activity, 73 it inevitably will
blur the lines of permissible police conduct and thus likely will
diminish the level of control that the law in fact exerts over that
conduct. The doctrine is frightening, and perhaps more than a
little naive, in its presupposition that police can protect themselves against injury and death by conducting weapons searches
only when some objective factor gives them reason to suspect
danger.7 4
There is some room for the Washington court to back away
from the more stark implications of its Ringer and Chrisman
70. Id.
71. Id. at 821-22, 676 P.2d at 424.
72. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d at 820, 676 P.2d at 423; Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 701,
674 P.2d at 1248.
73. These rules are the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.
74. In approving the practice of requiring persons lawfully detained for traffic violations to exit their cars routinely, rather than only when the officer has "reason to suspect
foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop," the United States Supreme
Court took due note of the potential, however remote, for violence in all such policesuspect encounters. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977). See also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (discussing efficacy of allowing police to neutralize danger in
all police-suspect contacts by reasonable means, rather than forcing an officer to trust his
ability to spot danger in a particular encounter according to objective criteria).
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opinions. The Ringer court quoted extensively from a decision
that seemed to base even the right to search the person of an
arrestee incident to a lawful arrest upon the exigencies of each
situation. 5 The Washington court could consign that citation to
the realm of dictum and reaffirm a general right to search any
arrested person for weapons, in view of the drastic consequences
of undetected possession. The Ringer court quoted from no
fewer than five decisions stating that police may search only for
evidence incident to the crime for which the arrest took place."
The Washington court should acknowledge that this limitation
is basically unsound because police officers ought to be free to
remove concealable or destructible evidence of any crime from
an arrestee and to prevent the evidence from being pointlessly
lost or disposed of in a way that would cast suspicion upon
others. 77 The Washington Supreme Court should not consider
itself precluded from considering the point by the extravagant
and unnecessary language of these cases.
Nonetheless, the Washington court has taken its baby steps
towards a warrant preference rule allowing warrantless privacy
violations only upon the demonstrated exigencies of each individual situation. This course seems at first blush to parallel the
traditional fourth amendment jurisprudential scheme that permits warrantless intrusions when they fall into certain categories
that have traditionally been fraught with exigencies. 78 But the
courses are not in fact parallel and therefore promise evergreater divergence. The Washington rule asks whether exigency
is present in a particular case. The federal rule asks whether the
case is of a kind associated with exigency. The two approaches
will necessarily produce some disparate results.
Two quite recent decisions complete the catalogue: State v.
75. 100 Wash. 2d at 692, 674 P.2d at 1244 (quoting Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. L.
Cas. 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853)).
76. 100 Wash. 2d at 692-97, 674 P.2d at 1244-46. The cases are Angello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); State v.
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 642-43, 374 P.2d 989, 991 (1962); State ex rel. Murphy v.
Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 105-06, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914); Dillon v. O'Brien, 20 L.R. Ir. 300, 317
(Ex. D. 1887).
77. For example, if the arresting officers are unable to pat down an arrestee who is
carrying concealed narcotics, the arrestee may, once having been placed in the patrol car,
stuff the material behind the seat of the vehicle, thereby casting suspicion upon later
occupants of the vehicle.
78. The exceptions to the warrant requirement have been characterized as "specific
situations, typically involving exigent circumstances, in which obtaining a warrant would
prove unfeasible or unnecessary." C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 108 (1980).
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Jackson7 9 and State v. Myrick.8 0 In each case the Washington
Supreme Court went out of its way to express disagreement with
decisions of its federal counterpart. The court did so, however,
with considerably more thoughtfulness than it had theretofore
displayed in section 7 analysis.
The Jackson decision set forth the requirements for establishing probable cause on the basis of an informant's tip. A
search warrant had been issued by a federal magistrate on the
basis of detailed information furnished by an identified informant of demonstrated reliability. Although the affidavit supporting the warrant did not show the basis of the informant's knowledge, it did set forth the results of police investigations that
corroborated some aspects of the informant's statements. The
corroborative data concerned conduct not in itself wrongful. The
warrant was subsequently executed by federal officers."'
In Illinois v. Gates,8 2 the United States Supreme Court held
that the sufficiency of an affidavit to establish probable cause is
to be determined by the "totality of the circumstances." 8 3 In
doing so, the Supreme Court overruled two of its own decisions,84 Aguilar v. Texas 5 and Spinelli v. United States.8 6 The
so-called Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test required that an affidavit resting solely on an informant's tip show two things: (1)
facts establishing the informant's characteristic reliability; and
(2) facts showing that the informant spoke from personal knowledge or its functional equivalent. 7 The Gates Court took note of
the obvious importance of both the informant's reliability and
the basis of his knowledge, but recognized that it is occasionally
possible to dispense with one or the other and come to a rational
conclusion that probable cause was present, particularly if adequate corroboration of the tip existed. The Court then proceeded to apply its "totality of the circumstances" test to find
probable cause on the basis of an anonymous letter corroborated
by police investigation. 8 The investigation corroborated only
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
102 Wash. 2d at 436-38, 688 P.2d at 137-38.
103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
Id. at 2332.
Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

378 U.S. 108 (1964).
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 436-38, 688 P.2d at 138-39.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
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innocent actions mentioned in the letter."
In Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court refused to
adopt the "totality of the circumstances" test to establish probable cause under section 7, adhering instead to the AguilarSpinelli approach.90 The Jackson court went out of its way to
reject Gates, as evidenced by the fact that it upheld the validity
of the search and thus had no need to consider that decision. 1
In so doing, the Washington Supreme Court delivered itself of
an outrageous, unsupported, and probably unsupportable (but
perhaps also unintended) dictum: "[RIecently we held that the
substantial difference in wording between the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. I, § 7 mandates that the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures to [sic] be interpreted more
expansively under the state constitution than under the federal
constitution."92 The authorities cited in support of this proposition do no more than state that the difference in wording
between the two constitutional provisions "allows" a more
expansive interpretation of the Washington document.9 3 It is

scarcely conceivable that the wording difference could "mandate" such an interpretation, requiring the consistent and reflexive rejection of all fourth amendment interpretations in an effort
to find more "expansive" ones in section 7. One assumes, therefore, that this dictum is not to be taken seriously.
Even if it did so with unseemly eagerness, the Washington
court firmly rejected Gates. The rejection came, however, with a
lengthy and thoughtful discussion of the relative merits of Gates
94 The soundness of its ultimate conclusion
and Aguilar-Spinelli.
will be discussed below.9 5 The court's willingness to grapple at
length with the underlying merits of the competing theories is,
however, a hopeful sign that the court is recognizing the importance of the theoretical development of a section 7
89. Id. at 2335.
90. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 438, 688 P.2d at 141.
91. Id. at 446, 688 P.2d at 144 (Dimmick, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 439, 688 P.2d at 141.
93. The authorities cited are State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419
(1984); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983); State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199
(1980); State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978). All of these cases state
that the Washington Supreme Court is permitted to interpret § 7 more expansively than
the United States Supreme Court interprets the fourth amendment. None state or imply,
however, that it is required to do so.
94. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 435-43, 688 P.2d at 138-44.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
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jurisprudence.
The Jackson opinion makes at least a plausible case for the
superiority of Aguilar-Spinelli over Gates as an interpretation
of the fourth amendment. What is frustratingly missing from
the opinion, however, is any effort to show that the AguilarSpinelli approach embodies the proper interpretation of the
Washington Constitution. Neither the wording nor the history of
that document is invoked to support the proposition that section
7, which does not even mention the words "probable cause,"
enshrines a pair of United States Supreme Court decisions from
the 1960s.
To make matters worse, the Jackson court upheld the
search warrant in that case by relying on corroboration of innocent activity to bolster the credibility of the informant's tip
This is the approach taken in Gates, the illogic of which is tellingly pointed out in Justice Utter's dissent in Jackson.6 The
majority opinion, taken as a whole, leaves the distinct impression that the Washington court is willing to grasp any opportunity to express disagreement with the United States Supreme
Court."7
The impression is but slightly ameliorated by State v.
Myrick,9" the most recent, and in many ways the most nearly
satisfactory, section 7 opinion. In that case, police had obtained
a search warrant for the defendant's land after observing marijuana growing thereon from an airplane flying over the land at
an altitude of 1500 feet without using visual enhancement
devices. The court upheld the warrant, concluding that the overflight did not violate the defendant's rights under section 7. 90 In
96. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 447-49, 688 P.2d at 144-46 (Utter, J., dissenting).
97. It is interesting that the court took no notice of the fact that the warrant had
been issued by a federal magistrate, executed by federal officers, and was presumably
valid under the fourth amendment. It is not self-evident that the fruits of such a search
should be suppressed in Washington courts under the Washington Constitution. In light
of State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) (suppressing on nonconstitutional grounds voice recordings lawfully made by federal officers), one can assume that
the Washington court could have unearthed a ground for suppression. It is certainly
arguable that a refusal to suppress would result in state officials attempting to persuade
federal officials to obtain evidence by the use of methods violating the state, but not the
federal Constitution, with a consequent erosion of state constitutional rights. Cf. Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (articles obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search and seizure by state officers, without involvement of federal officers, not admissible against defendant in a federal criminal trial). Nonetheless, some analysis of the issue
would have been of value to the bar.
98. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
99. Id. at 514, 688 P.2d at 156.
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doing so, the court rejected (or distinguished) still another
United States Supreme Court decision, but it based the rejection
on a thoughtful distinction between the wording of section 7 and
that of the fourth amendment.'0 0
The distinction is not difficult to draw. The issue in the case
was whether the overflight, which was not authorized by a warrant or by any exception to the warrant requirement, violated a
constitutional right of the defendant. For fourth amendment
purposes, the answer depends upon whether an overflight
amounts to a "search." The answer to that depends, in turn,
upon whether the overflight intrudes upon a "reasonable" or
"legitimate" expectation of privacy. 0 1 Privacy is not expressly
mentioned in the text of the fourth amendment, but the United
States Supreme Court has held that the amendment protects
privacy interests. 0 2 In order to effect that protection, the Court
developed the notion that a violation of a legitimate expectation
of privacy is a "search" for purposes of the fourth amendment. 03 The Washington Constitution, by contrast, expressly
protects "private affairs." There is no need to resort to an artificial interpretation of "search" to confer this protection. The
Myrick court could thus properly make the following statement:
"In contrast [to the fourth amendment] due to the explicit language of Const. art. I, § 7, under the Washington Constitution
the relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred
is whether the state unreasonably intruded into the defendant's
'private affairs.' "104 In explication of this standard, the court
added:
Const. art. I, § 7 analysis encompasses those legitimate privacy
expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment, but is not
confined to the subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many
100. Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
101. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test originated in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The quoted phrase is not actually used in that case, but
appears to be a paraphrase of the following language in the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan: "[Tihere is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361. The test was modified to one
of "legitimate expectation of privacy" in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
102. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
103. Id. at 353.
104. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510-11, 688 P.2d at 153-54.
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aspects of their lives. . . . Rather, it focuses on those privacy
interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be
entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a
warrant."0 5
The court also distinguished 0 6 Oliver v. United States,' 7
which held that "open fields" (encompassing all lands beyond
the "curtilage" of an adjacent dwelling) are not entitled to
fourth amendment protection. 0 8 The conclusion in Oliver that
people have no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in open fields
was based in part on the proposition that open fields were
neither "houses" nor "effects," and thus not within the scope of
Again contrasting Washington law,
the fourth amendment.'
Myrick stated that section 7 "precludes a 'protected places'
analysis and mandates protection of the person in his private
affairs.""'
The difference in wording between the two constitutional
provisions provides ample justification for construing them differently in situations such as those presented in Myrick. The
Washington Supreme Court's carefully articulated reliance on
the difference is a welcome sign of the court's willingness to
relate analysis of section 7 to its textual provisions. The rule
fashioned by the court, however, is not particularly helpful. The
rule refers to, but does not identify, "those privacy interests
which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to
hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.""'
Without further explication, the rule is a tautology. Moreover,
the court appears to utilize the reasonable expectation of privacy
test in determining the validity of the Myrick overflight." 2
Finally, the court's conclusion that an overflight at an altitude of
1500 feet, without visual enhancement, did not unreasonably
intrude upon the defendant's "private affairs" is a subjective
conclusion buttressed solely by reference to cases applying the
concept of reasonable expectation of privacy to overflights."'
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
Id. at 1740.
Id.
Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
Id. at 511-14, 688 P.2d at 154-56.
Id. at 511-12, 688 P.2d at 154.
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The decision gives little guidance to law enforcement officers
beyond telling them that if they overfly suspected marijuana
farms at an altitude no lower than 1500 feet and can identify the
marijuana without using binoculars or other vision-enhancing
devices, they are reasonably safe. The rule articulated in Myrick
is ostensibly quite different from that developed by the United
States Supreme Court. Any difference in application, however, is
at this writing speculative. The suspicion that the Washington
Supreme Court's search-and-seizure jurisprudence begins with
the presumptive rejection of fourth amendment doctrine of its
current federal counterpart is not wholly dispelled.
III.

COMPETING THEORIES

The seven modern cases interpreting article I, section 7
have laid the groundwork for articulation of a comprehensive
theory on which further development of the section should be
based. This Article presents three competing theories and suggests that the Washington Supreme Court consciously and expeditiously choose one from among these three theories or any
others that may be proffered by commentators or developed by
the court itself. Settling on a single theory, while not a practical
necessity, would add clarity, predictability, and consistency to
the development of the law. The three theories proposed here,
given names upon which improvement can surely be made, are:
the "literal" theory; the "orthodox" theory; and the "exigency"
theory.
A.

The "Literal" Theory

The "literal" theory is so called because it purports to apply
as written the actual language of section 7: "No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."1' 14 The radically different nature of this language from the fourth amendment has been blithely used as a
ground for departing from United States Supreme Court interpretations of the fourth amendment, but the words of section 7
itself have been virtually ignored. 15 Yet close examination of
those nearly unique words 16 demonstrates that they are capable
114. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
115. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984).
116. The only state constitutional provision identical to WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7,
appears to be ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.This information is derived from a series of mem-
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of sustaining an interpretive theory of great merit. 7
Simply put, the literal theory asserts that article I, section 7
justifies all of, and only, those home invasions or privacy disturbances authorized by statute, common law, or, perhaps, rules
and express policies adopted by politically responsible institutions. Put differently, official intrusion into protected interests
could be justified only by the express authorization of the deliberative processes of government or by the sparse and tested
principles of the common law. Express authorization, unless
invalid under some other principle, would be judicially honored.
After seventy years of judicial creation of search-and-seizure
law from constitutional principles, the idea of entrusting privacy
protection to the political process sounds both radical and naive.
Yet the idea is both ancient and of proven worth. It is instructive to read the quotation selected by the Washington Supreme
Court in Ringer as epitomizing both the common law and article
I, section 7:
[E]very official interference with individual liberty and security
is unlawful unless justified by some existing and specific statutory or common law rule; any search of private property will
similarly be a trespass and illegal unless some recognized lawful authority for it can be produced; in general, coercion should
only be brought to bear on individuals and their property at
the instance of regular judicial officers acting in accordance
with established and known rules of law, and not by executive
officers acting at their discretion; and finally it is the law,
whether common law or statute, and not a plea of public interest or an allegation of state necessity that will justify acts normally illegal." 8
This quotation admirably states a bold, old principle: that the
enemy of liberty is the executive official doing his job according
to his own best idea of how to proceed, and that liberty is safeguarded by a demand for adherence to precise and predetermined legal principles. The principles that lie at the core of our
protection from wrongful privacy invasions did not spring forth
from the brow of an Olympian jurist agonizingly meditating
oranda concerning WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, prepared in 1983 for Justice James M. Dolliver of the Washington Supreme Court by Craig Schuman, a student at the University
of Puget Sound School of Law, and used with the kind permission of Justice Dolliver.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 118-30.
118. 100 Wash. 2d at 691, 674 P.2d at 1243 (quoting P. POLYTIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE
9 (1982)) (emphasis added).
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upon constitutional mysteries. Rather, they accreted over the
years as judges and legislative bodies attempted to resolve, upon
principled bases, the eternal tensions between individual and
governmental rights. In other words, both we and those from
whom we derive our juridical heritage are and have always been
well served by a system that protects privacy by demanding a
specific grant of legislative or common-law authority to abridge
privacy rights.
One of the more lamentable consequences of "judicial activism" is the tendency toward judicial and public perception of
the courts as the sole guardians of liberty, the lonely sentinels
who watchfully hover over our precious freedoms lest they be
snatched away, like an infant by an eagle, by a rapacious legislature. If the history of Washington is an example, however, the
legislature has been diligent in its defense of privacy and loath
to authorize its violation, whereas the judiciary has been traditionally reluctant to interfere with perceived executive prerogative. The modern Washington statutes regulating electronic
eavesdropping and unauthorized voice recording" 9 go far
beyond the preexisting demands of state or federal case law. The
"knock-and-wait" laws,11° sometimes perceived as a restriction
on police rights to enter houses, are actually the sole source of
authorization to enter and are grudgingly conditioned upon the
fulfillment of certain prerequisites to entry. The exceptions to
the knock-and-wait rule have been judicial creations.' 2 1 By contrast, the record of an earlier Washington Supreme Court, set
forth candidly and in detail in Ringer, 22 is that of a sorry,
steady expansion of the search power of the police, on a case-bycase basis, far beyond any principled justification." 3
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1983) makes unlawful the recording of any communication over telephone or radio between two or more individuals, or of any private
conversation, without first obtaining the consent of the individuals involved. The statute
provides exceptions for news-gathering employees who have prior consent, or who make
the recording device obvious, and for calls of an emergency nature, such as the reporting
of a fire, crime, or other disaster.
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 (1983) provides: "To make an arrest in criminal
actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door, or windows of a dwelling
house or other building, or any other inclosure, if, after notice of his office and purpose,
he be refused admittance."
121. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256 (1980); State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d
212, 455 P.2d 595 (1969).
122. 100 Wash. 2d at 692-96, 674 P.2d at 1244-46.
123. The court in Ringer explained that the expansion of search power was accom-
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The Washington experience thus bolsters the proposition
that the legislature may be even more stringent than the courts
in limiting police powers. Nor would reason point to a different
result. If the Washington Supreme Court were to announce that
henceforth it would permit only those privacy invasions affirmatively authorized by statute, law enforcement personnel would
make a concerted effort to obtain authorization for the kinds of
conduct they deem necessary. A response by the civil-liberties
lobby would be certain, and a public debate would begin. The
importance and newsworthiness of the debate would spur public
interest and participation. The issue would be: what invasions of
home and privacy should be permitted, and on what conditions?
There is not the slightest reason to think that citizens would
cavalierly surrender their privacy rights in the face of any but
the most compelling demands for official intrusion. Could it be
seriously contended that the public or its legislative representatives would authorize comprehensive warrantless automobile
searches on probable cause or "incident to arrest" when no more
than police convenience could be offered to support them? In
the context of a legislative debate, the citizenry could scarcely
lose sight of the fact that its own liberties would be in issue.
By contrast, the decision facing a court in determining the
validity of a search or seizure already accomplished is inextricably bound up with the issue of whether to apply the exclusionary rule and "free the guilty." Courts have an understandable
reluctance to do so, particularly without support from any other
branch of government. The citizen who hears of such a decision
may have great difficulty in identifying with the "criminal" who
has been let off "on a technicality" and is likely to lose sight of
the protection of privacy issue in his outrage at a perceived
injustice. An attempt to control police conduct through legislative authorization would thus quite probably produce both
tighter control and greater public support for it than result from
the present judicial development of case law.
plished through cases that were "all without historical justification and are inconsistent
with traditional protections against the ability of law enforcement officers to make warrantless searches and seizures." Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247. The expansion of the search
power was accomplished through a steady disregard of WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, by focusing on the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The courts' expansions
of the exceptions eventually led to a situation in which the exceptions threatened to
swallow the rule that a warrant is required for a legal search. 100 Wash. 2d at 698, 674
P.2d at 1247.
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In fact, the most difficult question in applying the "literal"
theory might lie in deciding what effect, if any, to give to judicially created authorizations of police conduct. The term
"authority of law" in section 7 would doubtless include any
authority conferred by established principles of English common
law. "2' 4 But should the principle of common-law authorization be
applied to permit courts to create new kinds of authorized police
conduct in the course of case adjudication? Fourth amendment
jurisprudence, not to mention that of section 7, has developed as
almost exclusively judge-made law. Judicial development offers
the great advantage of flexibility in dealing with situations
unforeseen (though probably not unforeseeable) by a legislature.
The early history of the Washington Supreme Court 2 5 and the
recent record of the United States Supreme Court,'2 6 however,
demonstrate an unsettling judicial propensity to allow erosion of
civil liberties through the decision of difficult cases.
A strong argument can be made that if law enforcement
lacks the foresight to request detailed and express legislative
authorization for its conduct or lacks the ability to obtain
authorization through persuasion, it ought not to demand judicial ratification for its completed and prospective acts. Why
should the courts be allowed to give what the legislature has
withheld?
A somewhat more difficult question is whether the term
"authority of law" could be broadened enough to encompass
rules, regulations, or formal policies promulgated by executive
agencies such as police forces. The merit of using police
rulemaking to control police discretion (supplementing, rather
than supplanting, other fourth amendment requirements) has
been urged by Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam.' 2 7 To the
extent that police rulemaking is susceptible of development with
widespread public participation, it offers some of the possibiliz
ties of the legislative approach in limiting police conduct. It also
admits of much more detailed regulation than any other
approach. Self-regulation in the interest of the regulated, however, has not had great success as a device for limiting govern124. See authorities cited supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. See cases discussed in State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 692-96, 674 P.2d
1240, 1244-46 (1983).
126. See supra notes 14-48 and accompanying text.
127. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 346,
416-17 (1974).
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mental conduct. The potential for abuse exists because the political accountability of a police force is much less than that of a
legislature. To allow police rulemaking, in default of legislation,
to serve as the only control on police conduct would be a questionable policy, no matter how good the faith or how high the
professionalism of the police. Police rulemaking is certainly not
mandated by any reading of section 7, and it is not endorsed
here.
Despite the attractiveness of the "literal" theory,1 2 s in terms
of both its fidelity to the text of section 7 and its considerable
prospective policy merit, and despite its complete consistency
with the general analysis set forth in Ringer, the Washington
Supreme Court is scarcely committed to the adoption of this
theory. The court's general statement in Ringer that section 7
"poses an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches,
and seizures, with only limited exceptions"1' 2 9 is difficult to reconcile with a theory that would allow an informed electorate and
its legislative representatives to authorize whatever arrests,
searches, and seizures they wish. The Washington court's unfortunate dictum in another case, to the effect that legislatures
should be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule from
enacting unconstitutional statutes,' 30 hardly reveals strong judicial confidence in the willingness and ability of the most democratic branch of government to protect the civil liberties of the
demos.
The reluctance of the judiciary to trust the legislature is to
be expected. A willing transfer of significant power from one
branch of government to another is rare. The judicial activism
by which courts arrogate power to themselves is still the norm,
and new ideas (even old new ideas) are seldom quickly accepted.
Federalism allows Washington to be a laboratory and to experiment with a system that puts maximum restrictions on official
power to conduct searches and seizures and make arrests, with
maximum public support for such restriction. Tempting as such
experimentation may be, any device that diminishes the courts'
role as protectors of freedom is unlikely to meet with enthusiastic judicial response. Therefore, it is necessary to examine other
128. The author is deeply indebted to Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme
Court for his articulation and development of this theory in private conversation. This
does not necessarily imply that Justice Linde endorses the theory.
129. 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 674 P.2d at 1243.
130. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 105-08, 640 P.2d 1061, 1068-70 (1982).
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theories.
B.

The "Orthodox" Theory

The theory that best explains what the Washington
Supreme Court has done (though not what it has said) in interpreting article I, section 7 is that the constitutional provision
embodies the orthodox view of the fourth amendment. The
orthodox view is that the United States Supreme Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence is fundamentally sound, except to the
extent that its logical principles have been savaged by a number
of patently irrational decisions, particularly on the part of the
"Burger Court. 13 1 It would be crude, a trifle cynical, and perhaps an overstatement as well, to state that this view adopts
uncritically all United States Supreme Court decisions restricting police activity and accepts those authorizing police activity
only to the extent that they are rationally persuasive."3 2 Since
the Washington court must accept the minimal protections
afforded by the fourth amendment, the court has few occasions
to question its federal counterpart's restrictions on official conduct. Presumably that fact, rather than a persistent bias,
explains the paucity of such questioning in the Washington
Reports.
The orthodox view, in its simplest form, requires that
searches or seizures (including arrests) should be made on the
basis of warrants issued by neutral and detached magistrates, on
probable cause, and that the warrants must particularly describe
the objects of the search or seizure. 133 A warrant may be dispensed with only if one or more of a limited number of exceptions to the warrant requirement are present. These exceptions
are for situations that normally require necessity, though actual
131. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
132. The court stated in Chrisman: "We are not, however, limited to review under
the Fourth Amendment. The federal constitution only provides minimum protection of
individual rights. Accordingly, it is well established that decisions from the federal courts
'do not limit the right of state courts to accord . . .greater rights.' " 100 Wash. 2d at
817, 676 P.2d at 422.
133. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See also WASH. SuP. CT. CRIM. R. 2.3:
"If the court finds that probable cause for the issuance of a warrant exists, it shall issue a
warrant . . .identifying the property or person and naming or describing the person,
place or thing to be searched."
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necessity need not be present in a particular case.1 34
Several United States Supreme Court decisions have
departed from the orthodox doctrine, usually by enlarging warrant-requirement exceptions to include large classes of cases in
which no necessity for dispensing with a warrant exists.135 The
Washington Supreme Court's rejections of these decisions, as
well as other less exceptionable decisions,'1 36 are fully explainable
by the orthodox theory. The orthodox theory does not represent
poor policy. Its principles are rational, workable, and tested. Its
difficulties lie in its application to state constitutional searchand-seizure clause provisions generally, and to section 7 in
particular.
Any state court that interprets its own constitution by following generally the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court should give at least some consideration as to why it is
doing so. Textual similarity, or even identity, of the federal and
state provisions is not sufficient reason for giving federal decisions even a presumption of soundness. The existence of a fully
developed federal jurisprudence makes it convenient to employ
such a presumption and saves a good deal of analysis. If the
state and federal provisions both have the same meaning, however, the federal court does not enjoy a superior ability to determine that meaning. State courts ought always to give nonbinding decisions of the United States Supreme Court only such
effect as their persuasiveness justifies. The state courts should
be obliged to develop their own jurisprudence within only the
limits of their own energy. Hence, an interpretive theory that
unquestioningly accepts all United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, save that which is both distasteful and dispensable, is
fundamentally flawed.
In Washington, however, the problem is greatly compounded by the disparity in language between the two provisions.13 It is difficult to maintain that a constitutional convention that explicitly rejected a provision identical in wording to
134. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 78, at 102-08. Professor Whitebread
sets forth a detailed discussion of two competing theories held by various members of
the United States Supreme Court. The orthodox view, the theory set forth in the text
accompanying this footnote, is the theory that Professor Whitebread identifies as prevailing at the time he wrote his book in 1980.
135. Most notable are United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
136. See cases cited supra note 14.
137. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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the fourth amendment, in favor of one bearing no resemblance
to it, intended that the language would embody the same substance as the fourth amendment. The Washington drafters could
hardly have been in rebellion against United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, which, at the time the Washington Constitution was adopted, consisted of one significant decision. 3 8 The
drafters must therefore have intended that the provision be construed in a manner fundamentally different from the rejected
fourth amendment twin. An interpretation of section 7 as a document enshrining the real fourth amendment, without the
regrettable heresies of the most recent decade,13 9 is beyond the
powers of this author to justify.
C.

The "Exigency" Theory

Doubtless aware of the limitations of the orthodox view, the
Washington Supreme Court has made strides toward the articulation of the "exigency" theory, which seems to explain both
State v. Ringer140 and State v. Chrisman,"' the "heavenly
twins" or the "gruesome twosome," depending on one's point of
view, of Washington search-and-seizure law. The theory seems
to be that every warrantless search, seizure, or arrest is justifiable only if the search is necessary and the exigencies of a particular situation preclude resort to a warrant.", 2 The qualifier

"seems" is used because it is not at all clear that the court
intended such a broad rule.
The uncertainty arises because the Ringer decision
appeared to accept the propriety of a search incident to a lawful
arrest. 14 The Ringer court quoted liberally, however, from decisions that allow such a search only for weapons or evidence .of
the crime for which the arrest was made, and only when there1 is
44
some reason to think that weapons or evidence will be found.
Naturally, in those circumstances, resort to a warrant is out of
the question. Exigent circumstances are present, but the presence of necessity appears to depend on whether the police have
some reason to think that the particular arrestee has a weapon
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
These heresies are exemplified by the decisions cited supra note 135.
100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 701, 674 P.2d at 1248.
Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1248.
Id. at 692-94, 674 P.2d at 1244-45.
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or concealable evidence.
In Chrisman, the court held that an officer was entitled to
escort an arrestee into the arrestee's room only if there was some
reason to think that the arrestee would escape or seize a weapon,
and only if the officer was in fact concerned that the arrestee
would do so.' 4 5 Absent these circumstances, entry into the room

was unnecessary.' 46 Under traditional rules, a right to search or
accompany the arrestee would arise in every case of arrest, simply because arrests generally carry the potential for seizure of
weapons, destruction of evidence, or escape, even if the facts of
the particular case did not give rise to suspicion
that the partic14
ular arrestee would do any of those things.
The exigency theory has been criticized'" because of the
potentially grave danger faced by police if they must take the
risk that an arrestee whom they place in the rear of a patrol car
is armed unless they can point to some specific indication that
he may be armed. The gravity of the risk to an arresting officer
when the arrestee's possession of a deadly weapon goes undetected, despite its remoteness, speaks strongly in favor of
allowing a routine weapons search whenever a full-custody arrest
is made. An additional, though less compelling, argument would
support a routine search for destructible evidence in the same
situation. Otherwise, an arrestee could easily stuff a packet of
drugs behind the rear seat of a patrol car, casting suspicion upon
any recent rider in the car when the drugs are discovered.
The Washington Supreme Court could make clear, without
doing violence to the language or concepts of Ringer and Chrisman, that a routine search for weapons (and perhaps for contraband or destructible evidence as well) is a permissible incident
of a full-custody arrest. The court would thus leave only the fullcustody arrest exception to a general rule that demonstrable
necessity and exigency in each particular case are requisites of
any warrantless intrusion.
145. 100 Wash. 2d at 821, 676 P.2d at 424.
146. Id. at 819-20, 676 P.2d at 423-24.
147. The traditional theory was first developed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969). Simply stated, if an arresting officer is allowed to search an arrestee and
the area of the arrestee's immediate control, then the officer should also be allowed to
search any area with which the arrestee has come into contact. Under this theory, there
is always a risk that the arrestee may escape, destroy evidence, or grab a weapon that
would be dangerous to the arresting officer. The United States Supreme Court followed
this theory in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
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As the exigency theory is thus modified, what are its merits
and demerits? The exigency theory's strength lies in its clarity
and simplicity. One weakness, among others, is that the theory
depends heavily upon the ability of the individual law enforcement officer to make sound judgments in difficult, pressured situations, haunted always by the spectre of being unable to convince a court later of the objective soundness of his judgment.
Police officers are more comfortable following detailed rules. A
defined rule, moreover, may also better control police activity
and limit police discretion than a rule that places primary
emphasis on sound judgments in individual cases.' 49
The exigency theory's second weakness is that, while it
would undoubtedly encourage the use of warrants, it would inevitably diminish their quality. Its primary effect would be to
increase the use of telephonic warrants. While there is no reason
why such warrants cannot meet the constitutional demands of
probable cause and particular description, they are less likely to
do so than traditional warrants. Ordinary warrant procedure can
involve in the application process the services of prosecutors or
other legal advisors trained to ensure that a warrant and its supporting affidavit meet constitutional requisites. 150 In contrast, a
telephonic warrant is normally based on a two-way conversation
1 51
between a magistrate and the officer seeking the warrant.
Neither the warrant nor its supporting testimony can be reduced
to writing in advance with the advice of law-trained drafters. In
fact, the practical difficulties of involving any third person in the
quick issuance of a telephonic warrant would be almost insuperable. Without such involvement, warrants are substantially less
likely either to meet constitutional standards or to provide
meaningful protection.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THEORETICAL CHOICES

It is doubtful that further material development of a section
7 jurisprudence can take place without a firm choice of a theoretical approach to its provisions. The time is ripe for the Washington Supreme Court to make such a choice, either from among
149. See Amsterdam, supra note 127, at 416.
150. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1983); WASH. SUP.
CT. CRIM.

R. 2.3(c).

151. See, e.g., Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 696, 674 P.2d at 1246 (citing State v.
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962)).
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the foregoing alternatives, or from any other adequate theories
that may commend themselves to the court. Any choice among
competing theories should be made with as much insight as possible into the logical consequences of each choice. The following
discussion will outline some of the predictable consequences of
choosing any of the three theories identified in this Article.
The chief differences among the competing theories lie in
the circumstances in which warrants are not required. The consequences of theoretical' choices are thus likely to be greatest in
the applicability of the exceptions to the search warrant
requirement.
The most important exception eliminates the warrant
requirement for search incident to a lawful arrest. 52 This exception raises questions in two major areas: (1) lawfulness of the
arrest; and (2) propriety of the incident search. The question of
lawfulness of the arrest is an independent one under at least the
fourth amendment, as it constitutes a "seizure" of the "person"
within the meaning of the amendment.'5 3 Since an arrest warrant is required by the fourth amendment, absent exigent circumstances, as a condition of entering the arrestee's home to
make an arrest, 5 4 the difficult question concerns the lawfulness
of a warrantless arrest in a public place when obtaining a warrant would be feasible. The United States Supreme Court has
held, based on common-law tradition, that such an arrest is
lawful. 155
Under the literal theory, the lawfulness of such an arrest
would depend partly upon whether it had been authorized by
statute. Express legislative authorization would be sufficient.
Because of the clear common-law authority for such an arrest,
however, legislative authorization would appear not to be strictly
necessary. Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court could
legitimately declare the question fit for public debate, announce
that it would no longer rely upon the common-law rule, and
await a legislative response.
Under the orthodox theory, the well-established character
of the common-law rule would justify inclusion of the public
warrantless arrest on the list of traditional, and therefore per152.
153.
154.
155.
whether

See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
Id.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (the crucial question is
there is probable cause).
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missible, police practices. An argument could be made, however,
that the common-law credentials of the rule have been overstated by the United States Supreme Court, which veered from
orthodoxy in adopting it. Proper resolution would require a
detailed examination of the common-law rule and the modern
instances of its application.
Finally, under the exigency theory, the warrantless arrest
would presumably fail. The very feasibility of obtaining a warrant and the lack of exigency or necessity for failure to do so
dictate the result.
The question of whether a search is properly incident to an
arrest has already been alluded to. The United States Supreme
Court in Chimel v. California15 set forth a reasonable, defensible position when it limited the scope of searches incident to
arrest to the area within the arrestee's immediate control. The
Court justified searches incident to arrests because police need
to confiscate weapons and destructible evidence. None of the
three theories identified in this Article would necessarily justify
expansion beyond the Chimel doctrine of the scope of searches
incident to arrest.
For instance, in New York v. Belton,157 the Court sanctioned the search of the entire passenger compartment of an
automobile incident to the arrest of the driver. This decision is
beyond rational justification and could not meet the tests of
either the orthodox or the exigency theory. A small warning flag
goes up, however, when the literal theory is considered. Only the
narrowest kind of search incident to arrest would be justified
absent express legislative authorization. This is an area, however, in which the legislature might be tempted to confer such
authorization. Expansive searches incident to arrest do not
merely suit police convenience, they also permit searches that
otherwise often could not take place at all. For example, if police
arrest a driver without probable cause to search the vehicle,
neither the "automobile exception" nor the issuance of a search
warrant could justify a search of the vehicle. Both require probable cause.' 58 The resultant inability to search means that much
reliable physical evidence will be undiscoverable. Expansion of
the scope of search incident to arrest to Belton limits or beyond
156. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra note 147.
157. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
158. Carroll V. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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would doubtless be effective in bringing evidence to light and
thus has a certain appeal to law-enforcement-minded legislators.
Presumably, the citizenry would not sit still for such a legislative
assault on civil liberties, but a public unable to identify with
arrestees might feel it has no stake in the matter and bow before
the always-persuasive crime-fighting blandishments of law
enforcement. The risk that something like this could occur
should be borne in mind when evaluating the literal theory on
policy grounds.
All three theories would permit a weapons-and-evidence
search of the person of an arrestee under some circumstances.
The exigency theory, in its harshest form, would demand some
indication of danger for a weapons search and would confine the
evidence search to evidence of the crime for which arrest is
made.15 9 The merits and demerits of the exigency approach in
this regard have already been discussed. 6 0 The orthodox and literal theories would seem, on the basis of common-law tradition,
to routinely allow weapons and evidence searches. To the extent
that United States v. Robinson'6 ' allows these searches to
exceed the limits of what might be necessary to protect the
officer and prevent destruction of evidence, the Washington
courts should not follow the Robinson decision.
The "automobile exception" would be effectively wiped out
under any theory, as it has been in State v. Ringer,'6 ' subject to
an unlikely legislative resurrection under the "literal" theory.
The exception has a narrow justification under those circumstances when there is probable cause (that is, the basis for issuance of a search warrant) to search a vehicle and a real danger
that the vehicle will be moved out of the jurisdiction before a
warrant can be obtained.' 6 3 The exception has been flagrantly
abused by its employment in cases when the vehicle was under
police control and thus going nowhere. 6 4 With the availability of
telephonic warrants, there will be few cases in which the traditional justification applies. If the courts recognize a right to
detain a vehicle for a reasonable time pending issuance of a war159. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
161. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
162. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 700, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248 (1983).
163. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
164. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970).
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rant on probable cause to search it, all justification for employment of the exception will evaporate.
The emerging "inventory search" exception would likewise
have at most limited application under any theory. Under this
exception, police are permitted to examine the contents of containers lawfully in police custody in order to compile "inventories" of those contents.1 65 The "inventory" is justified on the
theory that it protects the police or the bailee from false allegations of theft of the contents or negligence in handling. 6 The
United States Supreme Court has upheld inventory searches in
two cases,'6 7 on the ground that the police interests served were
legitimate. The Court took the view that the availability of less
intrusive means of serving those same interests was immaterial.1 68 This approach is not entirely consistent with Washington
case law, which seems to require that inventory searches be
strictly limited in scope to that which is necessary to serve legitimate objectives.'6 9 Nor would the approach of the United States
Supreme Court be consistent with any of the theories advanced
herein.
There is, given the availability of less intrusive means,
neither necessity nor exigency to satisfy the exigency theory, nor
is there a common-law or traditional basis for the exception that
would satisfy the orthodox theory to justify inventory searches.
The political process is unlikely to produce an affirmative
authorization to allow police routinely to inventory-search
impounded cars because the citizenry would doubtless find the
intrusions personally obnoxious. On the other hand, the public
might be less opposed to a blanket authorization to inventorysearch an arrestee's personal effects before putting him behind
bars, and application of the literal theory might thus encourage
a legislative grant of such authority.
The exception that has been characterized as involving
"'hot pursuit,' evanescent evidence, and other 'emergency'
searches"'70 would probably undergo no functional change under
any theory. The exception definitionally involves exigent circum165. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
166. Id.
167. Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609-10 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
168. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609-10 (1983).
169. See State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 155, 622 P.2d 1218, 1226 (1980).
170. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 78, at 108.
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stances and thus would meet the broad exigency test of
Ringer."1 There has been no significant abuse of the exception
by the United States Supreme Court 172 and application of the
exception would be consistent with the orthodox theory. On the
other hand, it appears to lack common-law credentials and thus
may require legislation for its existence as "authority of law"
under the literal theory. The scope of such legislation would be
an entirely proper one for prior legislative determination.
Consent searches present serious theoretical and many practical difficulties. They are highly commonplace activities whose
theoretical justification has proved highly elusive .17 The two
consent-search problems most frequently encountered are: (1)
the validity of defendant's own consent;17 4 and (2) the validity of
175
third-party consent.
The United States Supreme Court's rule on the validity of
the defendant's own consent is clear, though theoretically
indefensible. Under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,176 the only criterion is voluntariness, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The defendant need not be advised by the officer requesting
77
consent, or even be aware, that he has a right not to consent.1
This result, while not necessarily unsound, was reached in a
most unsatisfactory manner. The Supreme Court accepted the
notion that a consent to search was a waiver of the fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 178 Disregarding the traditional definition of waiver as
"the intentional relinquishment of a known right,' 79 the Court
found a valid waiver of a right Bustamonte did not know he had
by reducing that right to second-class status on the basis that it
protects interests unrelated to the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 8 0
The same result could have been reached much more easily
and sensibly by simply recognizing a consent search as inherently reasonable. If it is entirely reasonable for a police officer to
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

100 Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248 (1983).
See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 78, ch. 8.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 206.
Id.
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 231-35.
Id. at 235-36.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237.
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honor a householder's urgent request to enter a home and look
for a burglar, it could hardly be inherently unreasonable for that
officer to make a courteous request to conduct a detailed search
and to act on the householder's actual or apparent assent. Differences between those two situations are matters of degree. (It
may also be noted that the making of a request to search implies
the right to refuse it.) Voluntariness is indeed important, for a
police officer can reasonably believe he enjoys consent only if he
believes that consent to be voluntary.
Third-party consent searches 81 present both similar and
different problems. If the cases have a common denominator, it
is that one may surrender his own privacy or property interests,
even if in so doing he surrenders those of another."' 2 The question could also be pursued as to whether the officer's reasonable
belief in the authority of the third party to consent would suffice. If a consent search is a reasonable search, nothing more
ought to be required than the officer's reasonable belief that he
has consent.
Two competing theories justify consent searches. The first
theory provides that a consent search is an actual waiver of
fourth amendment rights by one competent or authorized to
waive them. The second theory provides that a search based
upon a reasonable belief that consent is present is a reasonable

search. 183
The orthodox theory could accept either of these competing
theories, both of which are consistent with traditional fourth
amendment adjudication. The literal theory would probably
181. When two or more persons have equal rights in controlling or using premises or
property, any of the parties may consent to a search of the property, subject to the same
restrictions as normal consent searches. If evidence is found in such a search it may be
used against any of the controlling persons. In this instance, the consent of the third
party "constitutes a valid waiver of . . . [a] defendant's right to refuse search." C.
WHITEBREAD, supra note 78, at 206.
182. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); State v. Bellows, 72 Wash.
2d 264, 432 P.2d 654 (1967). In Matlock, the defendant's roommate consented to having
police officers search a room the two shared. 415 U.S. at 166. In Bellows, two defendants
were arrested on larceny charges. The facts showed that the two had been acting in
concert. Following their arrest, one of the defendants consented to a police search of
their motel room. In the room, the officers discovered evidence that helped lead to the
defendants' convictions. 72 Wash. 2d at 267-68, 432 P.2d at 656.
183. The waiver theory is the traditional one and apparently espoused in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The reasonable belief theory was suggested in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.3(g) (1978). The reasonable belief theory has been strongly criticized. See
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CI. L. REV. 47, 64 (1974).
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accept the second. The proper analysis of the language of section
7 would not be that a consent search is one made with "authority of law," which would seem to demand at least actual, rather
than apparent, consent, and which would be a cumbersome way
to refer to any kind of consent. Rather, the courts should hold
that a consent search does not involve either a "disturbance" in
private affairs or an "invasion" of a home.'8 4 Both of those
words carry strong connotations of nonconsent and could not
properly describe a consensual entry or search. Even apparent
consent, if the appearance is reasonable, could hardly be called
an invasion or disturbance.
The exigency theory does not appear to contemplate consent searches at all. If there is truly no room for them within its
ambit, the theory's limitations are painfully evident. It is
unthinkable that the Washington Supreme Court would abandon consent searches, which-apart from the danger of coercion,
express or implied, and the ease of fabricating a claim of consent-are unexceptionable and so common as to be virtually
unavoidable. Yet it is difficult to claim either necessity or exigency for a consent search.
"Stops and frisks" represent an important exception to the
warrant requirement. As originally conceived, in Terry v.
Ohio,' the exception contemplates a pat-down search for weapons, without warrant, probable cause, or grounds for arrest, of a
person with whom an officer is in contact, when the officer has
specific, articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion
that the person with whom he is dealing is armed and dangerous. The practical justification for some such exception is apparent; its theoretical justification consists of a generalized claim of
reasonableness.
The orthodox theory would probably accept most of the
United States Supreme Court's stop-and-frisk cases, since they
seem sound, both conceptually and in the light of experience.
The exigency theory might do the same, since the emphasis of
stop-and-frisk cases is on "specific and articulable facts," which
must be identified in every case in order to justify a frisk. This
approach is consistent with the exigency theory's demand that
necessity and exigency be shown in each case."8 6
184. See supra notes 178, 181 and accompanying text.
185. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
186. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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However, nothing in the exigency theory would legitimize
the initial police-citizen contact that must be made before the
right of frisk can arise. There is seldom a true need for such a
contact since the officer could simply avoid the citizen. Yet the
contact itself could easily be viewed as not involving a search or
seizure at all. So viewed, the contact would not require legitimation, and the exigency provided by the "specific and articulable
facts" would justify the frisk. But if the contact rose to the level
of a "detention, ' 1 87 it would require a justification not clearly
provided under the exigency theory.
Under the literal theory, an entirely different approach to
stop-and-frisk would be taken. The question would be one of
legislative authorization, without which no stop-and-frisk would
be permitted at all. The legislature would define the limits of
permissible stop-and-frisk. The New York Legislature took such
an approach, enacting a detailed stop-and-frisk statute.
In Sibron v. New York, 18 8 a companion case of Terry, 89 the
Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutionality of the
statute, focusing instead on whether the police conduct in that
case met the constitutional criteria set forth in Terry.' 90 With
that precedent, the Washington Legislature could not write a
fully effective stop-and-frisk statute that failed to meet the minimal constitutional criteria of Terry. The legislature would, however, have no difficulty in writing a statute imposing more severe
restrictions on official conduct than demanded by that decision
and its progeny. Such legislation, written with broad community
participation, might well be restrictive, sensible, and unlikely to
exacerbate police-community relations.
The foregoing, of course, attempts to do no more than
scratch the surface in suggesting ways in which the more important exceptions to the warrant requirement might be applied in
Washington, according to the search-and-seizure theory chosen.
The analysis is not intended as a text or model, but primarily to
187. Cf. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). In Place, the Court held that
temporarily detaining one's person and luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog did not violate the fourth amendment when there was a basis for reasonable
suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics. Respondent Place was detained at Miami
International Airport after his behavior aroused the suspicion of law enforcement
officers. Id. at 2640.
188. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
189. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
190. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 59-62. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Terry.

19851

Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory

inform the choice among theories by suggesting some consequences of each choice.1 9 '
V.

ADJUDICATIVE PRINCIPLES NOT DEPENDING ON CHOICE
AMONG COMPETING THEORIES

The competing constitutional theories heretofore considered
are irrelevant to a number of choices that the Washington
Supreme Court will have to face in determining whether to follow United States Supreme Court decisions. Other principles are
useful in making these choices.
A particularly interesting issue concerns the application of
the concept of "reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation of privacy. This concept, originally articulated in Katz v. United
States92 as a device to expand the fourth amendment beyond
the person and property protection mentioned in its text, has
been used frequently and has been highly workable. Its principal
utility lies in determining when certain official conduct, not
clearly a "search" or "seizure," nonetheless qualifies as the functional equivalent of one or the other for fourth amendment purposes.' 9 3 Thus, a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy " 4 is treated as a search or seizure. Conversely, a finding of
no legitimate expectation of privacy, at least in the absence of
what is clearly a "search" or "seizure," results in withdrawal of
fourth amendment protections.
The Washington courts have used the expectation of privacy theory. 95 Indeed, it is a highly appropriate theory for
191. Discussion of the administrative inspection cases, such as United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970),
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
has been omitted, principally because the cases do not appear to have influenced Washington law, nor do they appear likely to do so.
192. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
193. Id. at 353. The concept is especially useful when one's privacy right is equated
with one's property right under the fourth amendment.
194. The term was rechristened in this form by Justice Rehnquist in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). The difference in meaning between "reasonable" and
"legitimate" expectation of privacy was explained in this way:
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which
the law recognizes as 'legitimate.' . . . Legitimation of expectations of privacy
by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.
Id. at 143 n.12.
195. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981); State v. Simpson, 95
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Washington, in light of the express protection of privacy in section 7-a protection not found in the language of the fourth
amendment. There is no reason why it should not continue to be
extensively employed. The difficulty is that the doctrine has
been flagrantly misused by the United States Supreme Court in
such outrageous holdings as those that deny that a passenger
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment
of a car,' 96 or that a property owner can legitimately expect privacy in his fenced fields beyond the "curtilage" of his dwelling

house. 197
The difficulty lies, however, not with the expectation of privacy theory but with its application. The unsupported bare
assertions of presence or absence of legitimate expectation of
privacy that pepper the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court are simply wrong. The Washington courts should feel
entirely free to ignore these decisions and reach their own conclusions as to when a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.
They can do so by applying the standards set forth by the highest federal court' 9S-standards that, despite their misapplication, are fundamentally sound.
The approach actually adopted by the Washington Supreme
Court, however, is slightly but significantly different. In State v.
Myrick, 199 the court focused on the express language of section 7
protecting privacy."0 ' Instead of adopting the "reasonable expectation of privacy" language of fourth amendment analysis, it
identified the relevant test as "whether the state unreasonably
intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs.' "20 The court
Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). In Seagull, an officer on a routine search involving
another matter viewed what he believed to be a marijuana plant on defendant's property. The court held that the officer was lawfully on defendant's property. From this
information a search warrant was issued, leading to the confiscation of evidence upon
which defendant's conviction was based. The court held that, as the officer was lawfully
on the property and the material was in plain view, the defendant's privacy rights were
not violated, as she could have had no expectation of privacy under the facts. 95 Wash.
2d at 901, 632 P.2d at 46. In Simpson, officers arrested the defendant on a warrant
charging first-degree forgery. The officers also noted that the vehicle Simpson drove "did
not match" him, so they impounded the vehicle and checked its identification number,
finding that the vehicle had been stolen. The court ruled this impounding an intrusion
into Simpson's legitimate expectation of privacy. 95 Wash. 2d at 187, 622 P.2d at 1210.
196. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
197. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
198. See supra note 194.
199. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
200. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
201. 102 Wash. 2d at 510-11, 688 P.2d at 153-54.
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then proceeded to apply this test exactly as if it were properly
applying the "reasonable expectation of privacy" criterion. If the
language of section 7 does indeed call for a different privacy test
from that used (and frequently abused) by the United States
Supreme Court, such a test should be adopted. There seems little point, other than to twit the highest federal court, in discarding a quite workable test fashioned by that tribunal in favor of
one having no real difference.20 2
Another problem that can be intelligently addressed without choosing among competing general theories of section 7
jurisprudence is that of assessing the sufficiency of evidence to
show "probable cause" for the issuance of a search warrant or
the making of a warrantless arrest. This assumes, of course, that
a probable cause requirement will be read into section 7, which
makes no reference to probable cause. The assumption is based
on the proposition that requirements of probable cause and particular description are virtual logical corollaries of the idea of a
warrant as a judicial authorization precluding the exercise of
executive discretion. There would seem to be no point in dispensing with either probable cause or particular description, and
no voice has been heard suggesting that either be jettisoned.
Given a requirement of probable cause, two approaches
have developed for determining its existence in a particular case.
The first is to establish specific criteria for its existence. The
second is to examine in its entirety the evidence claimed to
establish probable cause and make a subjective, case-by-case
determination of its sufficiency. The first approach was taken by
the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s, when it adopted
the Aguilar-Spinelli 20 3 rule. Under this rule, the sufficiency of a
202. The Washington court hinted at a difference between its approach and that of
the fourth amendment when it stated that "§ 7 analysis encompasses those legitimate
privacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment, but is not confined to the
subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens who, due to well-publicized advances
in surveillance technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many aspects of
their lives." Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. If this suggests that the fourth amendment has
been interpreted in such a way as to render an expectation of privacy "unreasonable" or
"illegitimate" by virtue of surveillance technology advances permitting privacy invasions,
it appears incorrect. No authority is cited for such a proposition. Indeed, the very premise of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), fountainhead of the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy, is that technological advances making possible privacy
invasions do not diminish either the reasonableness or the likelihood of actuality of privacy expectations.
203. The rule is derived from, and named after, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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hearsay declaration, by itself, to show probable cause depended
on the establishment of two independent factors: the declarant's
personal reliability and the basis of the declarant's knowledge.
No matter how logically strong a showing may be made of the
credibility of the hearsay declaration, failure to establish either
of these factors was fatal. The second approach was taken by the
same court in 1983 when it overruled Aguilar and Spinelli in
Illinois v. Gates.20 4 That case held that the sufficiency of the evidence was to be determined in light of the "totality of the circumstances.12 5 Failure to establish one of the independent factors of declarant's personal credibility and the basis of
declarant's knowledge was not necessarily fatal. These two
approaches have been discussed in greater detail earlier in this
20 6
Article.
The Supreme Court made a strong argument in Gates for
the proposition that probable cause can logically be established
in at least some cases without slavish adherence to the demands
of Aguilar-Spinelli. On that premise, the Court concluded that
the Aguilar-Spinelli requirement of rigid obedience to its "twoprong" test was unsound and ought to be discarded. 0 7 Having
reached this reasonable conclusion, however, the United States
Supreme Court proceeded to find probable cause on the basis of
an anonymous letter, corroborated by the results of an official
investigation only as to matfers that bore no indicia of criminality. 20 8 The letter stated that a couple named Gates was dealing
in controlled substances and described the methods and routes
that they used to transport the substances to their home.20 9
Independent police investigation showed that the Gates couple
followed in general those methods and routes, but failed to disclose any evidence of criminal activity. 21 0 The Supreme Court
nonetheless concluded that the official corroboration sufficiently
bolstered the credibility of the anonymous letter to justify a conclusion that the allegations in the letter were accurate. 211 The
logic of this position is scarcely compelling.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
Id. at 2332.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
Id. at 2334-36.
Id. at 2335.
Id.
Id. at 2335-36.
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Gates seems to be a case of a reasonable rule grossly misapplied. If so, the problem is not with the rule but with its application. In deciding whether to apply the "totality of the circumstances" rule enunciated in Gates, as in determining whether to
apply the "reasonable expectation of privacy" rule, the Washington Supreme Court might well have considered whether the rule
has intrinsic merit. If the court found such merit, it might have
adopted the rule, while eschewing any misapplications by the
federal courts. Instead, as we have seen in our earlier discussion
of State v. Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court focused
exclusively on the relative merits of Aguilar-Spinelli and Gates,
assumed a necessity to choose between the two, and adopted the
former. 2 2 The court failed to consider the possibility that Gates
might represent a sound principle, cruelly abused by its discoverer, but quite valuable if applied rationally.
VI.

APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Washington judiciary, in construing section 7, will inescapably confront several issues regarding whether a given violation of the section calls for application of the exclusionary rule.
A strong argument exists, of course, for the outright abolition of
the rule. This Article, however, does not address that argument,
principally because the author has nothing new to contribute to
the debate. In view of Washington's long-standing commitment
to the exclusionary rule 13 and the total absence of judicial criticism, it is assumed that the rule will continue in force. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has chosen on several
occasions not to apply the rule, despite clear fourth amendment
violations. The question is whether Washington will follow suit
in any or all of the categories in which application of the rule is
withheld.
The key to answering this question is found in identifying
the purpose or purposes behind the exclusionary rule and acting
in furtherance thereof. Several purposes have been recognized.
The first and most prominent is deterrence of official misconduct. In all practical respects, the United States Supreme Court
currently recognizes only the deterrence purpose."' Deterrence
212.
213.
214.
128, 137

See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
The rule was adopted in State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922).
See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
(1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12
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of official misconduct is also recognized in Washington2 1 5 and
elsewhere. 16 A second identified purpose, mentioned but never
really approved by the United States Supreme Court, is the
preservation of judicial integrity. 17 Under this theory, the courts
become parties to official misconduct when they admit evidence
obtained through such misconduct.2 18
More recently, additional theories have begun to emerge.
Chief Justice Williams of the Washington Supreme Court began
the process of articulating a theory that would recognize the
exclusionary rule as a moral imperative not requiring utilitarian
justification." 9 More recently, Justice Brennan began the development of a theory that is similar, but which adds the notion
that the admission of illegally seized evidence is a new and independent fourth amendment violation in addition to the original
unconstitutional search or seizure.2 20
These various theories deserve consideration in a depth far
beyond the limited scope of this Article. Selection among them
will ultimately be influenced by value judgments, and this
author has no qualifications for attempting to impose his personal values on others. A generalized disposition for or against
application of the exclusionary rule will inevitably be a factor in
the selection process. Nonetheless, the following general statements about the merits of these theories would seem to be in
order.
The deterrence theory has great merit because it provides
an answer to the criticism that the exclusionary rule typically
works substantial injustice whenever it is applied by excluding
relevant, probative evidence, at great cost to the reliability of
the guilt-determining process.2 2 ' The answer (like the answer to
an argument questioning the value of any evidentiary privilege)
is that the rule works a compensating good by deterring official
(1968).
215. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 180-81, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206
(1980).
216. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
217. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
218. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955).
219. See Adams & Nock, supra note 25, at 24-30 (discussing State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 109-10, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-71 (1982)).
220. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3433 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

1985]

Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory

misconduct.
The great defect in the deterrence theory is that it permits
the argument that, in any particular category of cases, application of the exclusionary rule is not required because effective
deterrence generally can be provided by application of the
rule.2 2 2 The idea seems to be that one string at a time can be
removed from the bow of the violin without perceptible difference in tonal quality. One would imagine, however, that at some
point the metaphor falls flat. In all events, application of only
the deterrence theory seems inevitably to restrict application of
the exclusionary rule itself.
By contrast, the theories of judicial integrity and "moral
imperative," and what might be called the "Brennan doctrine,"2 2 all militate in favor of application of the exclusionary
rule in nearly every situation. The theories share a sense that
application of the rule whenever there has been a constitutional
violation is an act vindicating abstract justice, requiring no pragmatic justification. This high moral note represents the theories'
strength; their weakness lies principally in the fact that they

provide no satisfactory answer to the pragmatist who points to
the high cost of the exclusionary rule and tenders a demand for
a counterbalancing utilitarian justification.224 Furthermore, to
the extent that these theories depend upon vindication of outraged morality, they lose force in situations in which a particular
constitutional violation is, if not "technical," at least devoid of
moral culpability. In these situations, the morality of exclusion
of valuable evidence itself becomes an issue.
One of the most conspicuous areas of refusal to apply the
exclusionary rule is that involving the imposition of a requirement of "standing," or a demonstration that the search-andseizure rights of the party seeking exclusion were violated.22 5 In
222. The rule has been held inapplicable on this ground when police relied in good
faith on an apparently valid warrant, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); in
collateral-attack proceedings, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); in grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); and in civil tax proceedings,
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
223. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3433 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
224. A cynic has been defined as one who "knows the price of everything, and the
value of nothing." 0. WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE's FAN Act I. The exclusionary-rule cynic
is given no education by the "morality" theories in the value of the rule whose cost he
accurately assesses.
225. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1969).
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current United States Supreme Court parlance, the term "standing" is abjured in favor of a requirement that a party seeking
exclusion of evidence on fourth amendment grounds demonstrate a violation of his own legitimate expectation of privacy.22 6
Here, however, the general principles that a "deterrence" rationale militates against application of the exclusionary rule and
that a "morality" rationale militates in favor of the exclusionary
rule break down. As demonstrated elsewhere,22 7 proper application of the deterrence rationale would result in the imposition of
little or no standing requirement, a truism that the United
States Supreme Court has almost studiedly ignored.2 2 s At the
same time, Chief Justice Williams' "moral imperative" rationale
would logically produce a broad standing requirement that
would refuse to allow a party the windfall of exclusion of evidence obtained entirely in violation of the rights of another.2 2
Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court, without consideration of the relationship between standing and the purposes of
"automatic standing rule"
the exclusionary rule, has adopted an
2 30
that can allow just such a windfall.
It may be further noted that the "judicial integrity" rationale suggests abolition of any standing requirement, since it
focuses upon the responsibility of courts to avoid soiling themselves with tainted evidence, regardless of whose rights were violated in the tainting. With respect to the "Brennan doctrine,"
the proper analysis is somewhat murky, as is the doctrine itself.
Its central notion that admission of illegally obtained evidence
works a new fourth amendment violation independent of the
original search and seizure seems to militate in favor of a standing requirement. It would be incoherent to hold that a party
against whom illegally obtained evidence was offered would have
his constitutional rights violated anew by its admission when his
rights were not violated by the original obtaining of the
evidence.
The point is that a rational decision on whether to apply
the exclusionary rule in a case of constitutional violation can be
made only in light of the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
226.
Salvucci,
227.
228.
229.
230.

See
448
See
See
See
See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). See also United States v.
U.S. 83 (1980) (rejecting the "automatic standing" rule).
Adams & Nock, supra note 25.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3 (1978).
Adams & Nock, supra note 25, at 29-30.
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179-82, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206-07 (1980).
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Acceptance or rejection of any individual purpose should proceed in the light of the logical consequences of the choice of
principles.
A proper decision requires not only identification of the correct exclusionary rule purposes, but also their correct application. Failure of either can cause a court -to go wildly wrong. The
most recent and conspicuous example is found in the "goodfaith exception" cases of United States v. Leon2 31 and Massa23 2
These cases hold, broadly, that the
chusetts v. Sheppard.
exclusionary rule will not be applied when the police have acted
in good faith on an objectively reasonable belief in the validity
of a search warrant, despite the warrant's invalidity and, hence,
the unconstitutionality of the search.2 33 The rationale is simple,
and simply flawed. The argument is that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, that there is
none when police reasonably believe in the validity of the search
warrant they are executing, and that deterrence of police misconduct could not be expected to result from exclusion of the
evidence.23 4
The "good faith" approach is exactly wrong, however, proceeding as it does from a misapplication of the deterrence
rationale. 235 The Court's key mistake was in identifying the
objective of the exclusionary rule as "deterrence of police misconduct." Although police misconduct is a common feature of
fourth amendment violations, it is not an inevitable one. In light
of Leon and Sheppard, the deterrence rationale ought to be
recast as the prevention of fourth amendment violations. If prevention of fourth amendment violations is the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, excluding the evidence in Leon and Sheppard
would have admirably served this purpose. If fourth amendment
violations will result in exclusion of evidence, the police reasonably can be expected to take whatever steps are necessary to
avoid such exclusion, including ensuring the actual validity of
231. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
232. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
233. In Leon, the warrant was issued without probable cause. 104 S. Ct. at 3411. In
Sheppard, the warrant lacked particular description of the objects of the search. 104 S.
Ct. at 3428. Both probable cause and particular description are, of course, demanded by
the express language of the fourth amendment.
234. The misconduct involved is judicial and not thought subject to deterrence
through application of the exclusionary rule.
235. The decision will be the subject of intense criticism on a number of other
grounds. No comment on its validity in other respects is intended here.
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the warrants they obtain and execute. The police can and should
be encouraged to rely on the resources of prosecutors, departmental legal advisors, and anyone else with the expertise and
interest to ensure the validity of warrants and their supporting
affidavits. If these efforts are chronically unavailing; it may be
that fourth amendment doctrines have become too complicated
to be workable and need to be re-examined. If, as in Leon and
Sheppard, prosecutorial involvement is insufficient to guarantee
validity of the warrants, that means only what is already known:
any system of deterrence falls far short of complete success.
In all events, if deterrence is the chosen instrument to prevent fourth amendment violations, it should be ruthlessly
applied as the only device that encourages law enforcement to
meet the absolute standards of the fourth amendment. When, as
it must, the Washington judiciary faces the issue of whether to
recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it
ought to approach the matter with a good deal more care and
breadth of vision than has been displayed by the United States
Supreme Court.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the disarray of fourth amendment jurisprudence, state
courts have a splendid opportunity for the creation of rational
bodies of law governing searches, seizures, and related govern
mental intrusions on privacy. The Washington Supreme Court
has seized the opportunity and is well on its way to carrying it
out. But exploitation of the opportunity requires early enunciation of the applicable theories that must shape the creation of
any rational body of law.
This Article identifies competing theories of search-andseizure adjudication, particularly in light of Washington's relevant constitutional provision, and points out some of the consequences of the adoption of each. Although some of these theories
are more persuasive than others, the author's principal objective
is not to recommend one over another, but to provide a sort of
road map, pointing out the destinations that, absent back-tracking or cutting cross country, lie at the end of the route chosen at
each of several forks in the road.

